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However, empirical evidence to date including Pfeffer's, does not support the minority power hypothesis. Minority wage levels (as well as other rewards) have consistently been found to be negatively related to minority size, both with regard to gender (England et al. 1988 Furthermore, these negative relationships seem to corroborate three existing labor market theories negating the minority power argument. The first, terned majority power (Arrow 1972; Blalock 1967) , suggests that the negative relationship between the proportion of a minority group and its wage level results from an increasing proportion of the minority group. This poses a threat to members of the majority group employed within the same unit, who in turn act to reduce the minority group's wage level by means of discriumnatory practices against minority workers. The second, termed the crowding model (Bergmann 1971; Blau 1972) , contends that an oversupply of blacks or women exists within a relatively narrow range of "minority dominated" jobs, stemming from these groups' denied access to other types of job dominated by majority workers. The crowding of women or blacks into certain types of jobs or occupations results in their lower wage levels (see also According to this explanation, organizations that are mainly populated by minority workers are labeled as such (e.g, "female-type organizations"), thereby determining the firms' lower status and resulting in lower wages for all of their workers.
Although these three theories ("majority power," "crowding," and "labeling") provide reasonable explanations for the negative effect of group size on its income level, we believe that the minority power argument has not been used to its full potential and requires further conceptual elaboration and empirical testing. Specifically, we contend that the exclusive focus on size in the conceptualization of "group power" misrepresents this theoretical construct. Size is an important structural attribute in social relations both in classical (Simmel 1950) and in modem (Blau 1977 ) sociological theory. But to assert that power derives merely from group size is to ignore much of the literature on minority relations (Zimmer 1988 ). The iron law of oligarchy (Michels [19151 1962 ) and the minority rule in South Africa serve as examples where the powerless belong to the majority group. This implies that to account for a group's power, a distinction should be made between size in general and representation in key positions in particular. Whereas this distinction cannot be made in labor market occupational analysis, organizations afford a unique arena in which such a differentiation can be established and tested.
The basis of our claim may be found in the "token" argument put forward in Kanter's (1977) study of gender relations in organizations. Aware of the numerical composition of different social groups, she asserted that women lack power in certain occupations owing to their meager representation in these groups. Kanter referred to traditionally male occupations that dominate the workplace and provide their incumbents with higher remuneration and other rewards. One of the most prominent examples of such an occupation is the managerial elite, which is considered to be the stronghold of white, Protestant males. Exclusion of women and minorities from this exclusive group can also be assumed to deny them access to the main positions responsible for the hiring and promotion processes within firms, as well as for further allocation of resources and rewards. Thus, adequate testing of the minority power explanation requires the investigation of the effect of minority representation in management on earnings inequality. Saltzstein (1986) adopted a similar approach in studying the political arena. In differentiating between women in general and women in mayorship positions, Saltzstein found that the existence of female mayors increased the average representation of females in U.S. municipal governments during 1975-80.
Turning back to managers, empirical evidence reveals a low share of women (Auster 1988 and 10% respectively of these minority groups' share in the labor force.' Obviously, the proportion of minorities in managerial positions varies across organizations, and this article examines whether rewards are more equally distributed in organizations that have higher proportions of females or blacks in managerial positions than in those that exclude minorities from management. More specifically, we explore the interplay between (1) minority group size in general which is hypothesized on the basis of the aforementioned empirical evidence to have a negative effect on equality; and (2) the group's representation in management which, ceteris paribus, is hypothesized to have a positive effect on equality.
Furthermore, we investigate the possibility that a curvilinear functional form reflects the relationship between minority size and inequality.2 Although the minority power argument indicates that the salaries of minority workers increase linearly with their proportion in the organization, other literature suggests nonlinear relationships between minority proportions and earnings. For example, Pfeffer and Davis-Blake's (1987) study, based on Kanter's token argument state: "As women move from token to nontoken status, women's salaries should increase. However, once women move closer to majority status, there should be little if any further positive effect from increasing proportion of women, as the problems of tokenism have already been alleviated" (6). In addition, according to the "majority power" argument, as minority salaries increase and start to affect the salaries of majority workers, the latter tend to use power to prevent further salary increases for minority workers. This explanation implies a curvilinear form, comprising a positive effect up to a threshold from which the effect starts to be negative. Similarly, the institutional "labeling" explanation appears to present a nonlinear relationship between minority size and equality due to the tipping point required from which the organization begins to be labeled as a minority type. In light of these arguments, we introduce the possibility of a curvilinear relationship to the regression analyses presented below At this point, we would like to emphasize that the term "equality" in this study refers to similarities in occupational distributions of majority and minority workers rather than equal rewards within each occupation in a certain organization. In fact, due to the nature of the data, we must assume that majority and minority workers in the same occupation or job cluster are equally rewarded (as elaborated below).
Research Design

DATA
In the empirical examination of the above hypotheses we used data on 132 privately owned firms employing 100 workers or more. The data were collected as part of the Detroit Area Study (DAS) during 1972-73.3 The unit of analysis in the DAS was the establishment (see Granovetter 1981) , defined here as any business location whose personnel management function is autonomous of any sibling or parent firm and which makes its own hiring and firing decisions (DAS 1974 In order to gather reliable data on a variety of the firms' characteristics, interviews were conducted with three functionaries in each establishment: the managing director, the personnel manager and a first line supervisor. Most of the data used in this article were provided by interviews with the personnel director.
We should emphasize that the data used in this study were collected during 1972-73 in the Detroit area. This may require some caution in the interpretation of the findings. The early 1970s in the U.S. were characterized by heightened sensitivity to civil rights issues and by increased efforts to introduce changes in legislation and in the practice of race and gender relations. In fact, the data that we used in this study were part of an effort to investigate discrimination within the context of employment relationships. It is possible, therefore, that the findings of this study are period-dependent, and that the conclusions would have been different had we analyzed more recent data. Nonetheless, two reasons justify the use of the data. Second, we are interested in testing a theoretical issue rather than in the descriptive aspects of the study. The theoretical question requires data at the organizational level, which is rare and difficult to obtain. Thus, we believe that time can be considered as a control variable since all of the establishments were investigated during the same period. The same argument is valid for the effect of location. It is true that the Detroit area is not representative of the U.S.: a very high proportion of workers in the study (see below) are unionized, and a high proportion of blacks are employed by the establishments used in the study. Again, the unit of analysis is the establishment, and geographical location might be perceived as a control variable. It is true, however, that these assumptions regarding time and location do not guarantee that a lack of significant effects cannot be attributed to idiosyncratic features of the data. For example, the larger-than-average union representation in the sample may weaken the relationship between the percentage of blacks and salary inequality.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
We used three dependent variables. The first (weighted reward calculated for the minority group) comprised the average occupational salaries across occupations within each establishment, weighted by the occupational distribution of the minority group (one for females and one for blacks) within the establishment. The second (weighted reward calculated for the majority group) constituted the average occupational salaries across occupations within each establishment, weighted by the occupational distribution of the majority group (one for males and one for whites) within the establishment.
Using algebraic terms, these two dependent variables can be expressed as The third dependent variable consists of the ratio between the two previous variables (minority over majority). A ratio close to unity indicates similar occupational distributions among the majority and the minority groups. A ratio smaller than one indicates a distribution that favors the majority group, whereas a ratio larger than one indicates a distribution in favor of the minority group. As expected, the ratios of females-to-males and blacks-to-whites do not exceed unity. The mean ratio across establishments was 0.76 (std. dev. = 0.22) for the gender groups and 0.83 (std. dev. = 0.13) for the racial groups. Across industries, the ratios ranged from 0.74 in construction to 0.95 in the trade sector for the gender groups, and from 0.81 in finance to 0.95 in trade for the racial groups.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The two main independent variables consisted of the natural logarithm of the proportion of each minority group within the establishment's work force, its squared term (to detect for possible curvilinear effect of the variable on the rewards), and the proportion of managers belonging to each minority group (i.e., the natural logarithm of percent females or blacks in the total managerial group).5 On average, women constituted approximately 33% and blacks 17% of the work force in the establishments sampled. These figures vary by type of industry; the sector with the largest proportion of women was finance (63%) whereas the smallest proportion was found in the construction industry (5%). The highest percentage of blacks was found in the service industry (27%) and the smallest in transportation (8%). The largest proportion of women in management was found in the trade sector (20% of all managers) and the smallest in transportation (4%). The highest percentage of blacks in management was found in the service sector (11%) and the smallest in transportation (2%) and finance (3%).
Analysis of worker segregation (measured by the index of dissimilarity, see Duncan & Duncan 1955 ) across the establishments in the sample reveals a higher degree of segregation among the gender groups (42%) as compared to the racial groups (25%). This is consistent with other studies that show that gender segregation exceeds racial segregation (e.g., Albelda 1986).
CONTROL VA BLES
We used the following control variables: Unionization According to the "collective voice" perspective (Freeman & Medoff 1984) , unions have an equalizing effect on wages. Previous research has also indicated that unions may have opposite effects on the wages of black and female workers. On the one hand, unionization has brought about an increase in the average salaries of the heavily organized black workers and has thus tended to modify wage differentials between blacks and whites (Ashenfelter 1972 (Ashenfelter , 1973 . On the other hand, women are less likely to be unionized than men. Unionization may thus result in a widening of the gender gap (Rees 1979). In any event, students of labor markets unanimously agree that unions should have an effect on wage equality (Baron 1984 ). We used a dummy variable to indicate whether the firm had a contract with a union. About 70% of the firms in the sample were unionized.6 Growth Earnings equality is likely to be related to the opportunity structure within an organization. Organizational growth provides us with a measure of opportunity structure. We assume that competition between majority and minority workers is less severe in organizations experiencing growth than in those undergoing contraction. Previous research has revealed that opportunities are created by growth "spill over" for groups that may not otherwise benefit from them (Bielby & Baron 1983; Rosenbaum 1979 ). We used a dummy variable that indicates whether the establishment had gone through a period of growth or a period of contraction during the previous five years. Approximately 33% of the organizations in the sample experienced growth during the five years preceding the data collection. We should note that possible selection effects could bias our results (Berk 1983; Heckman 1980) . Two selection processes are relevant to our analyses. The first is a possible selectivity occurring during the entrance of people into the labor market. The second is a possible selection process occurring while labor force participants join the studied firms. Unfortunately, our data do not enable us to control for such possibilities since we know nothing about the labor force in firms not included in our sample or about people who decided not to join the labor force. However, other studies correcting for selectivity bias (e.g., Blau & Belier 1988) indicated that among women (both black and white) with the same productivity levels, those who are included in the labor force have a better earning ability than the women not joining the labor force. Among men we observe the reversed trend, namely those outside the labor force could earn more than equally productive men who chose to join the labor market. The results also indicate that selectivity processes are more significant among whites (both men and women) than among blacks. Thus, if there is a selectivity bias resulted from our sample, it would probably lead to an underestimation of the effect of women's proportions on the dependent variables, and lead to no bias associated with the effect of blacks' proportions. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in the study, and Table 2 presents the correlations between the dependent variables and all the independent variables. Table 2 clearly shows that the proportion of minority workers in managerial positions is highly correlated with the proportion of minority workers in the establishment: .55 for women and .63 for blacks. The proportion of female workers exerts a negative effect on the rewards obtained by females but not on those obtained by males. The proportion of black workers was found to have an effect on the rewards of both whites and blacks. Table 3 presents the simultaneous effects of all independent variables on the rewards allocated to each group and on the minority-to-majority rewards ratio.
Results
The first three equations present the results for the gender groups (rewards distributed to females, to males and the females-to-males ratio). Equations 4-6 present the results for the racial groups (blacks, whites, and the blacks-to-whites ratio).
The proportion of female workers within the firm had a curvilinear effect on their own rewards (that is, a positive effect on the level of rewards up to a point where they reached a large proportion and a negative effect thereafter) and had no effect on the rewards level allocated to male workers nor on the ratio of female to male rewards. The lack of a significant effect for the proportion of females on the ratio variable, despite a significant effect on females' rewards, most likely stemmed from the curvilinear pattern.
The findings regarding the effect of the proportion of black workers differed from those for women. Whereas the proportion of black workers did not have any effect on their own rewards, it had a negative effect (beyond a certain threshold) on the rewards allocated to white workers. However, this effect was not sufficient to be associated with a lower gap between the rewards of black and white workers.
More important, however, was the relationship between the proportion of the minority group in management and the distribution of rewards within establishments. The findings presented in Table 3 indeed suggest that the higher the proportion of female and black managers, the smaller the rewards allocated to males and white workers respectively, although this proportion was found to have no effect on the rewards allocated to the minority group itself. This effect is translated into a smaller gap among the gender groups only. That is, the presence of women managers in the firms had an equalizing effect on the distribution of rewards between the gender groups.
Interestingly enough, this equalizing effect appeared to be related to a lower level of rewards obtained by men rather than to a higher level of rewards for a Occupational salaries are measured on a 9-point ordinal scale, ranging from 1 -under $5,000 to 9 -above $40,000.
women. In other words, men (and whites for that matter) working in establishments with female managers (or black managers) earned less in comparison with their counterparts working in establishments with a low proportion of women managers. That is, the extent to which minority workers entered into management positions did not explain the variation in rewards allocated to minority workers across organizations. This finding does not support the One may argue, however, that the results were confounded because the dependent variables included the rewards received by managers. If managers earned more than nonmanagers, then the level of rewards received by a minority group would increase concomitantly with the percentage of managers in that group. This objection is not fully warranted, since managers are part of the firm's labor force and as such it is not clear whether they should be excluded from the analysis. Moreover, the denominator in the dependent variables referred to the group (i.e., minority or majority) population, whereas the denominator in the variables dealing with the proportion of managers referred to the entire population of managers in the establishment (comprising both minority and majority employees). Nevertheless, in anticipation of such criticism, we reanalyzed the data and estimated the same equations, excluding the rewards distributed to managers from the dependent variables.
We found that the results for females were identical to those described above. The new analysis upheld the equalizing effect exerted by female managers on the ratio of female-to-male rewards. This effect seemed to operate via the salaries of the male rather than of the female workers; males working in establishments with a high proportion of female managers earned less than those working in establishments with a low proportion of female managers.
In the reanalysis, the negative effect of the squared term of percent blacks (i.e., relatively large proportions of black workers) on whites' rewards disappeared. The larger gap between the proportion of black and white managers than between the proportion of black and white workers as a whole was probably responsible for this result. The exclusion of managers from the analysis led to the lack of an effect of percent blacks on whites' rewards. However, the analysis revealed a negative association between the proportion of black managers and the rewards of both blacks and whites. In other words, black and white workers become relatively "deprived" by working in firms with a high proportion of black managers. We believe that this phenomenon stems from the larger gap between black managers' and black workers' rewards than from the corresponding gap among whites. At any rate, these analyses do not lend support to the minority power argument whereby an increase in the percentage of minority workers among managers is expected to have a positive effect on the rewards allocated to their minority group members.
Discussion
The results presented in this article have some intriguing implications that deserve elaboration. In the examination of two sets of demographic characteristics -the proportion of minority workers in the establishment and the proportion of managers belonging to the minority group -this study demonstrates an effect on the distribution of rewards as well as on the equality between groups within organizations. Let us try to interpret the results in light of the theoretical arguments presented at the outset of the article.
We first found that the proportion of minority workers is an organizational attribute that has a negative effect on the level of rewards in these firms for female and white workers. This result is inconsistent with the "crowding" hypothesis which maintains that minority workers are channeled into a narrow range of firms with an already high proportion of minority workers (either 1983; Scott 1987b) suggests that stereotypes and normative pressures (i.e., labeling a firm as a "minority type") result in lower wage levels for all groups, including majority groups, who work in organizations dominated by minority workers. This interpretation of the institutional theory generates mixed conclusions for different minorities. Women working in "female-type" firms receive lower rewards than women working in other firms. Furthermore, in the case of women, the curvilinear effect provides some support for the labeling explanation: the representation of women has a positive starting effect on their rewards, and becomes negative only beyond a certain threshold -which can serve as a tipping point for labeling. However, men working in "female-type" firms are not affected by this label, and their rewards are not significantly different from the rewards that men receive by working in other firms.
Conversely, white workers in "black-type" firms are "penalized" when the number of blacks employed reaches a certain proportion of the work force. Black workers, however, are not affected by working in black-type firms. Perhaps the different stereotypes associated with gender and race have an impact on the differences between the two groups' associated labeling processes, calling for further research. For example, it might take a higher representation of women in the workforce to label an organization as female in comparison to the proportion of blacks necessary for a black label. However, the institutional theory predicts that all groups should be affected by the labeling process. Consequently, we cannot conclude that the theory finds support by the results of this study.
Furthermore, this study did not directly test institutional theory; thus the rejection of other explanations does not corroborate the institutional perspective by default. Alternative hypothetical explanations for which the present study offers no relevant data require exploration in future research. For example, we suggested earlier that certain selection processes might have occurred when participants joined the studied firms. For reasons other than labeling, majority workers with different characteristics may have joined 'majority-type" and "minority-type" organizations. Using different hiring and selection mechanisms for majority workers may also differentiate the two types of firms.
The current findings also hold important implications for the minority power argument. Rather than limit our focus to only the proportion of minority workers, we have also considered how managers in minority groups influence the distribution of rewards within organizations. This approach provides a more delicate operationalization of the concept of power, which has been overlooked in general labor market studies. Kanter (1977) believed that the entrance of more females into managerial positions would improve the conditions of women in the corporation. Our findings support Kanter's expectations but do not necessarily substantiate the minority power explanation. Women working in organizations with a high proportion of female managers tend to be more equally rewarded vis A vis males working in the same organizations. However,. this equality is a consequence of lower rewards allocated to males working in these firms rather than a result of increased rewards for women.
The equalizing effect observed in the case of female workers was not found for blacks. There is no indication that the presence of blacks in managerial positions improves the situation of blacks working in those establishments as compared to establishments with no black managers. On the contrary, we found that the presence of black managers has a negative effect on the rewards received by blacks (as well as whites).
This divergence in the results between the gender and the racial groups requires further interpretation. As we implied above, it may be related to selective mechanisms within the kind of organizations in which blacks achieve managerial positions. In other words, organizational variables that explain blacks' low earnings in organizations with a high proportion of black managers may have been omitted from the analysis. For example, it is possible that less profitable organizations with a lower capability for mobilizing external resources (Yuchtman & Seashore 1967 ) are more likely to employ black managers. We may argue further that organizations which offer fewer opportunities are less likely to promote equality among their members (see Rosenbaum 1979), thereby explaining our apparently paradoxical finding. We have no empirical evidence, however, to support such a hypothesis. In a subsequent analysis that we conducted in this direction, no significant correlation was found between the performance of establishments (as indicated by profits) or the value of such establishments (as indicated by their assets) and the proportion of black (or female) managers. This does not mean, however, that there are no alternative explanations that can help in interpreting the findings.
To summarize, although we did not find support for the minority power hypothesis, we can clearly state that organizational demography has a crucial effect on the inequality in rewards allocation between minority and majority groups. A note of caution regarding the results obtained in this study should be made explicitly. Our main purpose in this study was to test a theoretical question using a specific sample with unique characteristics, particularly its larger-than-average race and union compositions. The predominance of unions in the 1972-73 Detroit area data may have suppressed the effect of the racial composition on salary inequality, thus precluding significant findings to support the minority power argument. Nevertheless, we believe that this rare data set contains unique and attractive features that enable us to conduct empirical tests essential for organizational studies. Whether the findings can be generalized to other states in the U.S, or to the present day remains to be seen.
Lastly, we should remind the reader that this study emphasizes the consequences of demographic compositions on inequality, yet highlights the need for research into the construction of demographical compositions (i.e., the proportion of minority workers as a whole and in managerial positions) in organizations. Future study should attempt to identify the organizational characteristics of firms that are more likely to open their gates and to provide equal opportunities to women and black workers in acquiring managerial positions. In fact, such a study would explore the determinants of the division of labor within firms.
5. The results of the ratio equations are not biased despite the fact that the number of majority and minority workers N() serve as components of both the dependent (i.e., ratio) and independent (proportion of the minority group) variables. in addition to N<?O we use the number of group members in each occupational category (nig) in the construction of the ratio variable. Since the ratio variable represents the minority-to-majority occupational distributions, we can examine the effect of the proportion of the minority group on this ratio as long as the occupational distributions (i.e., n 1/N1k) differ across groups. For example, assume an organization with two occupationalcategories. All men (denoted by "mn) are concentrated in one categoxy, and all women (denoted by "w") are concentrated in the other, as follows: In this case, the ratio variable becomes a ratio of the average occupational salaries (s2/sl), and as such, is not constrained by the proportion (independent variable). 6. Note that the proportion of unionized establishments in the sample is an overestimation of the phenomenon in the American labor market and we use this variable for control purposes only. Any substantive conclusion regarding the effect of unionization on earnings might be misleading. 7. The index comprised three questions put to the personnel managers, inquiring whether the personnel office made final decisions regarding three dimensions of personnel management: hiring, promotions, and employee dismissals. The variables were standardized before the index was created. In the absence of a personnel office, the value of 0 was assigned.
